The Report of the
Commission of Inquiry named the chief culprits of the Muskrat fiasco as Ed Martin, Gilbert Bennett
and the PMT. Some of the originals, including Bennett and Harrington, were
permitted to keep their positions. The Commissioner’s conclusion evokes a
number of questions including whether Stan Marshall was the right person for
the job.

Last week’s piece
concluded that he was not. 

More important for this
conversation, is the Government’s relationship with Marshall, the public’s
reaction to their hands-off approach, and the worry that our expectations of  politicians and public servants remain low.

Let’s start here.

What is Muskrat’s status five years after Marshal’s

It isn’t very pretty and
that is partly because Premier Ball, and subsequently Stan Marshall, accepted
Nalcor’s – yes, Nalcor’s – conclusion that it was too late to shut down the
Muskrat Falls Project. It is tantamount to having the foxes assess the integrity
and viability of the chicken coop they had undermined.

The consequences of this decision are still ahead of us.

The latest commissioning
date for Muskrat reported to the PUB is November 14, 2021. Liberty, the
no-nonsense Consultant hired by the PUB to parse Nalcor’s claims, is

The Project continues to
suffer setbacks from problems associated with the synchronous condensers (which
stabilize the electricity grid), bi-pole software over which Marshall dithered
with GE (the contractor), under designed bolts, problems with welds, and other issues.
They also include repairs associated with last winter’s rime ice damage to the electrodes
and other (under designed) components on the Labrador Island Link (LIL).

Stan Marshall (photo credit: Saltwire)

Likely due to all those
unresolved issues, NL Hydro’s own confidence in Muskrat is anything but high. That
is the reason upgrades to the Holyrood Generating Plant were made to increase
its reliability next winter.

An improved Holyrood Generating Plant may well be Stan
Marshall’s legacy after five years at the helm.

Liberty reported in May,
2021 that their concerns over Muskrat were “not just about bringing the LIL to
commercial operation, but in evaluating its long-term exposure to
weather-related outages.”

The substandard design
ought to have been a key feature of a competent and independent review of the
Muskrat Falls Project in 2016. Stated Liberty, “it would be rash to conclude that the threat of
still lengthy LIL delays has passed into history.”


Assessing Stan Marshall’s Tenure at Nalcor (Part 1)

David Vardy’s Ten Commandments for Rate mitigation

The Hard Truth About the Value of the Muskrat Falls Project

Those issues give you a
pretty good idea of the shallowness of Nalcor’s – and Stan Marshall’s – Muskrat
Falls review and why a more independent assessment in 2016 might have suggested
that the project represents something less an asset than “sunk cost”.

An unrepaired LIL,
together with the prospect that the Holyrood thermal plant might have been shut
down as originally proposed, suggests that the Island could have come face to
face with DarkNl.2 last winter. It is doubtful, however, that this consequence even
made it into the public’s consciousness.

Worrisome, therefore, is
that our laid-back relationship with government, which some describe as “hope for the
best”, is emblematic of doubts that we can govern ourselves.

There are other reasons
for raising this question now.

We might remember that when
he became CEO, Stan Marshall answered to a new Board of Directors and to a new
Premier after Paul Davis was defeated in 2015. Many will also remember the
prior Board’s mass resignation and the showering of benefits on Ed Martin after
he quit, placed a spotlight on that quisling group.  

The new Board of Nalcor
ought to have insisted on executive replacements as soon as it was evident that
Marshall was not up to the task. 

They did not, suggesting
that one group of quislings were replaced with another.

Marshall’s flat footedness
ought to have come under the notice of Premier Ball and Minister Siobhan Coady.
Following the conclusion of the $16.5 million LeBlanc Commission of Inquiry, another
Premier – Andrew Furey – and Coady’s replacement, Andrew Parsons, were in possession of all the evidence needed to
dislodge Vice President Gilbert Bennett and any hangers-on among the PMT –
including Paul Harrington. This same group, by the way, are still under
investigation by the RNC.

Yet, each of them – Board
Members and politicians, including Dwight Ball and Andrew Furey – took a hands-off approach to the way Stan Marshall decided to run the project. Their actions differed
from those of Danny Williams and Kathy Dunderdale only in the way the latter were
complicit with Ed Martin; otherwise, they also handed the project off to the next CEO – and hoped for the
best. The unwarranted assumption was made that Stan Marshall knew his stuff.

What have we learned from
the Muskrat Falls fiasco?

Probably nothing.

What does this say about
the capacity of more recent governments to protect the public interest any more
than did the Governments of the Williams/Dunderdale/Tom Marshall/Paul Davis era?

Stan Marshall may have unwittingly
answered this question best.

On his way to the exit on
June 10th, Marshall told reporters: “y
ou are going
to need the expertise that’s at Nalcor…if we’re going to deal with the Upper
Churchill…with rate mitigation measures…Atlantic Loops and Gull Island…if you
don’t, your going to end up in the same disasters we have had in the past…if
you want to do Gull Island this is the time to do it…we have all these highly
skilled people available to us.”

Remember, Marshall is referring to the same
“unprincipled” group that the Commissioner found to be unqualified to manage
the project at the start, who Stan Marshall, himself, admitted “w
ere learning as they went along”; the same group who succeeded
in giving the province a $13 billion project, likely having a negative value.

Marshall advises Government that a group who deceived the Government, the
public, and made one of the greatest blunders in the history of global
megaprojects, should be elevated to even bigger leagues.

It is disturbing when not
just the Government but an entire NL society is mute in response to the drivel that
Stan Marshall shared upon his departure. Not just his time as the CEO but his ostensibly sage departing words of advice deserved condemnation. Instead, they went unanswered – by virtually everyone.

Can we govern ourselves?

Not so long as people
think they have something to lose by putting officialdom in their place.

Des Sullivan
Des Sullivan
St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada Uncle Gnarley is hosted by Des Sullivan, of St. John's. He is a businessman engaged over three decades in real estate management and development companies and in retail. He is currently a Director of Dorset Investments Limited and Donovan Holdings Limited. During his early career he served as Executive Assistant to Premier's Frank D. Moores (1975-1979) and Brian Peckford (1979-1985). He also served as a Part-Time Board Member on the Canada-Newfoundland Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB). Uncle Gnarley appears on the masthead representing serious and unambiguous positions on NL politics and public policy. Uncle Gnarley is a fiscal conservative possessing distinctly liberal values and a non-partisan persusasion. Those values and opinions underlie this writer's views on NL's politics, economy and society. Uncle Gnarley publishes Monday mornings and more often when events warrant.


Bill left public life shortly after the signing of the Atlantic Accord and became a member of the Court of Appeal until his retirement in 2003. During his time on the court he was involved in a number of successful appeals which overturned wrongful convictions, for which he was recognized by Innocence Canada. Bill had a special place in his heart for the underdog.

Churchill Falls Explainer (Coles Notes version)

If CFLCo is required to maximize its profit, then CFLCo should sell its electricity to the highest bidder(s) on the most advantageous terms available.


This is the most important set of negotiations we have engaged in since the Atlantic Accord and Hibernia. Despite being a small jurisdiction we proved to be smart and nimble enough to negotiate good deals on both. They have stood the test of time and have resulted in billions of dollars in royalties and created an industry which represents over a quarter of our economy. Will we prove to be smart and nimble enough to do the same with the Upper Churchill?