Paul Davis
did not tell the people of this province that we could not borrow long term
money. That’s the situation we are currently facing in the province….”
Premier Dwight Ball (VOCM Open Line February 2-, 2016)

I wasn’t
sure that I had heard the Premier right; I waited until VOCM had posted Paddy
Daly’s Open Line Show on its archive and listened again, and again. Indeed, he did say it:
“… we could not borrow long term money…”

Ball seemed apprehensive, even scared. Later, I wondered if he fully understood the
implications of what he had said.

This may seem, to some, a very complex issue; but that is true only in its detail. Most people would understand the implications of having their credit card taken away. 

A couple of
points are in order:

First, the Government
can only borrow long-term debt after a money Bill has been passed by the House
of Assembly. When the limit cited in the Bill has been reached, the Government must
return to the House and seek approval before borrowing more. I
wondered if Ball was confusing the legislative requirement with issues pertaining strictly to the bond market.

there is nothing new or unusual about Government’s use of “short-term” 1, 3,
and 12 month Treasury Bills, known as T-Bills. Short-term debt instruments help
large companies and governments manage their Treasury functions, especially those who have uneven revenue streams during the year, as all governments do. When
the amount of short-term debt grows unwieldy or too expensive, the long term
debt market is tapped. The most favourable timing is identified by the
Government’s financial advisers for liquidity (availability of capital) and
the most favourable Coupon (the interest rate).  

Right now,
short-term money is cheaper than long-term; but borrowing large amounts via short term T-Bills, as this province is now doing, isn’t without risk. 

The global economy is overshadowed by many black swans; there is always danger the rate of interest on short-term Notes will shoot up or the government
is forced to pay more for bond funding than it had planned, which impacts the
current account. 

Already forgotten is the melt-down of the American
economy, in 2007-8, when short-term liquidity, among the banks, dried up.

CBC reporter
Peter Cowan tweeted on Tuesday, February 23rd, 2016 that the
Government “in the last 3 months issued 3 and 31 year bonds totalling $535
million”.  The information, he said, had
come via the Finance Department. Cowan added a qualifier in his tweet: the “Province
borrowing difficult” but (it is) still able to raise some money”.

Such an
appraisal of our ability to borrow does not exactly constitute a comfort
letter. But, it means Ball was only partly wrong, just barely, about the
province’s long term borrowing capability. 

Sources familiar
with the issue explain that the Canadian bond market, especially for the smaller
provinces, is very “illiquid”, right now. Not just Newfoundland and Labrador,
but at least two other provinces have not completed their long-term borrowing
programs, this year. The situation, in part, maybe a matter of timing and
strategy; every borrower wants the lowest possible rate of interest. But, it is
clear that provinces, especially the smaller ones, will have to check their appetite
for debt.

An illiquid bond market is due, in part, to historically low interest rates.
Investors, especially income and pension funds, are reluctant to commit large
capital sums, long term, given the paltry returns. Long term rates for
provincial bonds hover around three percent. CBC’s Peter Cowan noted that this province had borrowed 31 year money, recently, at 3.3%.  

Not surprisingly, U.S./Can. currency
fluctuations are not helping this market, either.
Interest rate
spreads (interest rate charged by banks minus the deposit rate) are also low;
ultimately, buyers and sellers will determine bond yields, but investors are not taking on large risks for little return.

On average,
provincial bonds have a yield of about 100 basis points (equal to 1%) higher
than more secure Federal Government debt.

The problem is, as one source describes, liquidity for NL bonds is worse than for other
, meaning there is limited capital
available for NL bonds and t
he pool of traders, in NL bonds, is also small. Bonds are traded much as equities are; institutions need to be able to adjust their portfolios which illiquidity would prevent.

The fact that this
province has been absent from the bond market for several years, owing to its
recent brief flirt with wealth, doesn’t help. And, neither does
provincial indebtedness, which as a
percentage of provincial GDP, is on the rise and a warning to the risk averse.

Like the
stock market, however, the bond market is all about risk and reward. It is not hard to
see in what direction the Province’s cost of borrowing is headed.

NL is experiencing a
financial “perfect” storm, exemplified by a collapse in oil prices and a $2
billion operating deficit. A potential sinkhole at Muskrat Falls is made worse
by a diminishing electricity demand curve and an ageing demographic. Lenders want
all major risks quantified. A likely downgrade of the province’s credit does
not constitute a magnet for capital, either. 
NL won’t even qualify for equalization for at least four years.

Cheap long term money will be hard
to come by.

All that said, the
Province is “rolling over” short term T-Bills of around $2 billion. A new
fiscal year begins in only six weeks. An additional sum, at least $4 billion,
possibly more, (ask Nalcor CEO Ed Martin) will have to be

When so much short
term debt must be “rolled over”, every three months, there is a big concern of a
hiccup in the world economy, a further decline in government revenues (i.e.
HST and oil royalties), or a downgrade by the rating agencies will reduce, even
further, the province’s access to the long-term debt market.

But even illiquid
markets can be greased. The issue isn’t (at least, not yet) whether the
Government can borrow, as the Premier has stated. The question is: what rate of interest is the Government prepared to pay to get investors to loosen up?

Likely, this question is inseparable from the fundamental issue of Ball’s own political leadership. Access to the bond market will widen only if his Administration is capable
of addressing, immediately, our budget deficit; if it has a plan, and can demonstrate it is committed to achieving fiscal balance within a reasonable
period of time. 

A failure of leadership risks means an illiquid bond market will be closed. 

Premier Ball ought
to have known, and his officials ought to have warned him, there is no room for
half statements on matters having a direct bearing on the Province’s fiscal

Yet, confused as they seemed to be, his remarks
serve as one more warning of difficult choices.

Ball and his Minister
of Finance have six weeks to polish their articulation.

The bond market will be expecting more clarity than the Premier offered Paddy Daly.
Des Sullivan
Des Sullivan
St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada Uncle Gnarley is hosted by Des Sullivan, of St. John's. He is a businessman engaged over three decades in real estate management and development companies and in retail. He is currently a Director of Dorset Investments Limited and Donovan Holdings Limited. During his early career he served as Executive Assistant to Premier's Frank D. Moores (1975-1979) and Brian Peckford (1979-1985). He also served as a Part-Time Board Member on the Canada-Newfoundland Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB). Uncle Gnarley appears on the masthead representing serious and unambiguous positions on NL politics and public policy. Uncle Gnarley is a fiscal conservative possessing distinctly liberal values and a non-partisan persusasion. Those values and opinions underlie this writer's views on NL's politics, economy and society. Uncle Gnarley publishes Monday mornings and more often when events warrant.


Bill left public life shortly after the signing of the Atlantic Accord and became a member of the Court of Appeal until his retirement in 2003. During his time on the court he was involved in a number of successful appeals which overturned wrongful convictions, for which he was recognized by Innocence Canada. Bill had a special place in his heart for the underdog.

Churchill Falls Explainer (Coles Notes version)

If CFLCo is required to maximize its profit, then CFLCo should sell its electricity to the highest bidder(s) on the most advantageous terms available.


This is the most important set of negotiations we have engaged in since the Atlantic Accord and Hibernia. Despite being a small jurisdiction we proved to be smart and nimble enough to negotiate good deals on both. They have stood the test of time and have resulted in billions of dollars in royalties and created an industry which represents over a quarter of our economy. Will we prove to be smart and nimble enough to do the same with the Upper Churchill?


  1. This was covered in the Telegram this morning as well. This quote is very telling

    “The question will always be, ‘What are you going to do about your current situation?’” he said.

    'The question will always be, ‘What are you going to do about your current situation? he said.The reaction will be much more positive if we have a plan that we can show them.'

    Fuck sakes. If we had a plan? What the hell are we paying politicians and senior beaurocrats if they do not have a plan! This is something that was foreseeable 1 year ago. There is no excuse for there to be no ready made plan, ready to implement.

    We need to start holding people accountable in this province, for the poor performance of their jobs. Williams, Dunderdale, Marshall, Senior Finance DM and ADM's should all be brought in front of a all party committee. Drilled to understand how did we get here, and why was nothing done.

    It is scandalous that we have no plan. it is Embarrassing that the premier of 4 months would admit it.

    The time for action is now before we are all doomed.

    • `Fuck sakes`…. it made me laugh, being so appropriate. Was not the Liberals who promised a plan during the election, but did not want to give details. And now say `if we had a plan` Shoot the lot of them (joking of course). Is there any `dollar a year` men or women in government who would set an example how serious the situation is.

  2. In today's Telegram article Ball is doing the right thing by starting to qualify this situation to every day citizens and the union leaders, that this province is about to be out his management hands and into the lenders/bankers that will keep us a going concern. They are asking what changes, cuts, savings etc., you plan to make and that will be key, so Union's get in the game and realize this is now your problem too. If you are not a part of the solution you are a part of the problem. Layoffs and tax increases are coming one way or another and Dwight Ball and the citizens of this province will have no say in it, it will be the Banks and our lenders that drive the changes needed. Same goes for MF and Nalcor.

    • Never thought I would say this, but can Fortis help save us. To think, we have a long term debt of what, 9 billion, and may double to about 20 billion, largely due to the Muskrat Falls project.
      Yet one Nfld company, Fortis has assets of 28.8 billion dollars. About 3 times the debt accumulated since Joey brought us into Confederation. We are pumping some 700 million into MF each year, and this is besides the 5 billion Nalcor is borrowing to finish MF. And Fortis had a revenue of 6.7 billion in 2015, almost as much as the Nfld budget!. And they made a profit , net earnings of 728 million. Blows my mind….almost. Perhaps if I were Premier I would be asking ` can you take this off our hands, can you give us 2 billion, not likely, well how about 1 billion…… surely it is worth more than a dollar!.

  3. If you want to solve the issues at Nalcor and Muskrat Falls. Pay Stan Marshall 4 Million bucks to run it for 1 year.

    Fortis is a 8 Billion a year company, whose corporate office has 40 people. Stan Marshall knows effeciency. Ed Martin has almost 40 people in his communications, business development departments alone.

  4. While he may be worth 4 million a year, perhaps he would become a `dollar a year man`! But, I guess he deserves his retirement.
    While Marshall knows efficiency, as far as Fortis goes, it is not practised for Nfld Power customers. One of the worst efficiency programs in the country. But this helps their profit.