For most engineers the
execution of a megaproject is principally about the calibre of those in charge
of management. Many don’t concern themselves with issues like water management, the question of whether it is a ‘political’ project, or whether the government has made a
premature sanction decision. Most simply want the construction phase to benefit
from the best practices of the industry and their profession.
The Muskrat Falls project is proceeding poorly; even the Nalcor CEO has been forced to admit he can’t
guarantee either the schedule or the budget will be achieved.
Imagine, therefore, that you
had a group of professionals weigh in on how they would “fix” the problem of “slippage”
and address fundamental cost and other issues. What
do you think they might they say?
Recently, I had that
opportunity; some engineers are at their wits end over how the project is managed. It was not just a theoretical exercise; they are intimately familiar with the Muskrat Falls project.
While Nalcor is not likely
to listen, I thought the public should have a better understanding of the type
and magnitude of the problems experienced at Muskrat Falls, and why the future of
the project is in doubt.
These are the top four
recommendations of those engineers:
several managers in the project management system. The project simply needs
better managers; this has been a problem from the very beginning.
all of the project team staying in St. John’s to Happy Valley- Goose Bay. SHUT DOWN
the Torbay office, except for possibly a few accounting people. Relocate all
key management and engineering staff to the MF site; the very idea of managing
such a project remotely from St. John’s is expensive and damaging to morale. Even
minor decisions have to be referred to St. John’s. The construction site has
suffered from low morale from the start. Besides, major projects are not
normally managed in such a way.
that is to say reduce the scope of the Astaldi contract by removing the
powerhouse and some of the civil work from the contractor. One engineer suggested
replacing Astaldi, that it might be cheaper if Nalcor simply bought out the
Astaldi contract. Another engineer
suggested Astaldi ought to have been partnered with a contractor with the
strengths it lacked.
was given the contract only because its bid price was lowest; even then it was
not a lump-sum bid. Astaldi is said to have no cold weather experience and no
union based experience. Weak Astaldi management has been “beefed up” with weak
Nalcor management. Recently, an ex-Kiewit manager replaced the one at Astaldi. Some
productivity improvements have been reported.)
the Muskrat Falls site an “open site” and walk away from the current labour
language in the union agreement. For readers not familiar, an “open site” is variously
defined as a labour force model in which all unions are permitted to have
employees (i.e. not a “closed shop”) working together. Another model is one in
which both union and non-union workers are permitted to be employed on a work
site. Both models are based upon
securing the best labour force available, and where everyone is paid well. The
“Teamsters” or “closed-shop” model, used at the Vale project, in Long Harbour, was
reported to be highly unproductive . That is the model adopted for the Muskrat
Falls project, too.
- Establish a project
execution plan. There has never
been a project execution plan for this project. Such a plan tends to be what
one engineer called a “wordy” document but it is a critical piece of work
because it outlines a construction strategy, describes how milestones will
be achieved, and identifies the risks and how to manage them. (An
execution strategy also identifies the planning tools and strategies to
assure productivity and break down work packages; it reflects the
challenges and takes into account the size and complexity of such a large
project. It helps define solutions to labour productivity issues, project
management, workface planning and organization, always using industry
based best practices. Weather, snow, and cold temperatures would have been
a major focus of such an execution strategy.)
a meaningful updated schedule based upon actual measured completeness and what
remains to be done. The engineers state that if a recent (two months ago) audit
had been undertaken of powerhouse/spillway contract the completion figure might be closer to 9% than to the 26.3%
reported by the government’s oversight committee at the end of March, 2015.
course, the oversight committee was only parroting a Nalcor figure (35% was the
“planned” scheduled progress figure to March 2015). 9% is a long way from 35%! The oversight committee also reported
that 37.5% of the budget for the Generation Facility was incurred at the
end of December, 2014.
the engineers point out, the devil is in the details. They state the public
will never know the truth about “real” progress at Muskrat unless an independent
3rd party conducts a quantity survey based on known construction
engineers state they have never witnessed “change-orders” appear so fast as at
Muskrat Falls. Such change orders are a major reason for cost overruns. (The engineers also raised the point that if
you don’t tie administration hours to project progress, you can burn a lot of
money and show no actual site completion.)
person interviewed stated that Nalcor has what he termed a “self-controlled”
budget. There is no independent budget manager.
He stated he has never seen financials controls like on this project where
monies are advanced without any consideration for the amount actually allocated
for a piece of work.
thoroughly the “self-performing” approach taken to quality control on site
contracts. Rather than Nalcor having established an independent third party
inspection and testing process of supplied equipment and materials, the
contracts are written so that the Quality Assurance is performed by the
example given was with respect to MTR Certificate for rebar (This is a Mill
Test Report, a quality assurance document). Nalcor was asked if any testing had
been conducted on the material. The reply: “that’s Astaldi’s responsibility”. The engineers stated this just does not happen
on major construction projects. This is the Owner’s role; it is further proof,
they say, Nalcor is not qualified to be running the Muskrat Falls project.
major contracts in regards to their ability to control total cost.
engineer stated that Nalcor needs an independent group to audit both the work
performed and the contracts it has awarded; otherwise, the door is wide open to
stated that while Nalcor says its contracts are “unit price” based, Astaldi, for
example, can perform work in a most inefficient way and still invoice Nalcor.
in detail the costing for the project and existing unorthodox (to say the
least) project controls methodology. These are not this Blogger’s words! The
engineer stated he has never seen more creative accounting with money moved
around from one account to another; presumably, he stated, the money will eventually
kind” or what is normally considered proto-types in the case of the
turbine governors and possibly other components. Though the Chinese company had
manufactured smaller turbines, it has not built any as large as those produced
for Muskrat Falls. Yet, Nalcor did not provide oversight, for quality assurance
purposes, when those turbines were built.
will be surprised just how sweeping are that group’s proposals for change on
the Muskrat Falls construction site.
endemic to an extent that the project is doomed to suffer a very late completion,
major cost overruns, and a poor quality of work, too, due to the absence of an
adequate Quality Assurance program.
the project was its first and worst decision. The Nalcor management team, except
for a couple of individuals, are simply not of a calibre to be undertaking such
a large project, they said.
the contrary is true. They see a megaproject very poorly managed and they don’t want it to fail.
It is time for them, Nalcor, and the government to stop pretending everything is fine.