Guest Post Written by “JM”

release of the Government’s most recent oversight report exposes the extent
to which the Muskrat Falls project is in trouble.   

every slipping milestone, and changing cost estimate, the credibility of
Nalcor’s leadership is being questioned, too. 

Pam Frampton at the Telegram  and the CBC’s Azzo Rezori  penned excellent columns this past
weekend,  as did Russell Wangersky on
Monday, which documented clear frustration with Nalcor’s ability to obfuscate
the real truth on the project’s status. 

delay to the project cannot be hidden.  One
has to look no further than to the pictures of the site, 3 years into
construction, to truly understand the extent of work that awaits completion. 

Top: artist’s rendition completed Muskrat Falls project (Nalcor image).
Bottom:  image shows current status of construction.

is no denying that the completion of the concrete pour on the Spillway is a great
accomplishment: 48,000 m
3 placed
during the last year.  It is a massive
structure, and represents an important milestone for the project. 

the Spillway is minor when compared with the 460,000 m3 of concrete required
for the powerhouse, and 200,000 m3 for the North and South
Dams.  In total, some 760,000 m3 of
concrete will be required to complete the project.  

The author extrapolates that, to date, only 20-25%
of the total concrete requirement has been completed. Assuming 75% of the
concrete hasn’t been placed, the figure is equal to 570,000 m3.  

his July 2015 interview on NTV,  Ed Martin indicated that Astaldi is completing over 20,000 m3 of
concrete per month, a figure nearing a Canadian record. Assuming 25,000 m3 can
be cast in each of the 6 good weather months, and only half of that volume achieved
in the 6 month winter period, recent site experience indicates that 225,000 m3
of concrete can be cast per year (about double the 2015 rate).  Simple extrapolation suggests this rate of
concrete placement is equivalent to about another 2.5 years of concrete operations.  

The pour rate of concrete is not the only
metric that one can use to peer into the project’s progress, but its accuracy
is well recognized in the construction  industry.

on the current schedule, the concrete placement for the powerhouse will not be
completed until mid-2017.  But, of
course, finishing the concrete does not complete the powerhouse, anyway.

you examine the original schedules provided by Nalcor (page 156 of this Link), 
completion, associated with the power house, occurs nearly 2 years prior to the
date proposed for full commercial power (the schedule indicated completed powerhouse
concrete placement by Q2-2015 to achieve full commercial power by Q2-2017).   

The November 2013 Independent Engineer’s Report  also indicates a 2 year period is required,
following completion of concrete operations, to allow for the installation and
commissioning of the mechanical equipment inside the power house.    

Stated another way, an optimistic
completion date for full commercial power is mid-2019.   Considering even modest amounts of future
slippage, it will be the end of 2019, or later, before first commercial power

a less optimistic context, when you consider the meager progress which occurred
in the first three years of the project, full commercial power in Q4-2019 actually remains a stretch target, in the opinion of the author. 

can talk about schedule improvements, mitigation measures, and alternative
execution strategies; however, it is time that they began to properly forecast
future schedule performance, based on past experience.   

It is time for Nalcor to release the
optimistic (P10), likely (P50) and pessimistic (P90) schedules for the
completion of the project.  They need to base
these forecasts on historical norms, rather than merely adding slippage to
date, to the original project schedule. That approach meets no engineering

important, Nalcor must provide more information to show how their most recent
cost estimate of $7.6 billion has been determined. 

of the most worrying aspects of Ed Martin’s recent announcement was the
acknowledgement the North and South dams were significantly over budget.  That means the problem was formally
recognized in Nalcor’s cost estimates only with the signing of the

Yet, Nalcor must have known about this significant overrun in late 2014, after the
bid closed.  The public record suggests they
knew in December 2014, when Nalcor advised the oversight committee that
clarifications on the contract were underway (page 25 of Report). 

current project $7.6 billion estimate should not be an arbitrary number.

engineering practice is to forecast using sensitivities based upon change
orders, future contract awards, and estimated future costs to arrive at the
most realistic final landing position. 
Nalcor seem to make project cost revisions only when change orders are
executed, or when contracts are signed.  This
is not standard practice in project cost reporting. 

need to provide full transparency as to the anticipated final project costs,
considering all known factors, including the schedule delay.  CEO Ed Martin should not be making offhanded,
and oblique references to the potential for future cost increases, as he did in interviews last week.  The
engineering profession offers Nalcor well-defined methodologies for project
cost estimation. The estimates are available in-house, and constantly updated by
his own staff; the problem is Martin does not want to share that information
with the public. 

be perfectly blunt, the jig is up for Nalcor. It is time for Ed Martin to be
fully transparent.  As it stands, the
public should consider the information, released last week, pure fiction.

Related Post by “JM”



some issues require special emphasis:

Nalcor must come clean on the project schedule. 
2019 is a more likely completion date, than 2018, for full commercial
power.  This delay will have an impact on
the direct costs of the project, the interest during construction, and the
associated delays between the contractors.  

year’s delay will result in a minimum of $150 million additional interest costs
during construction (IDC) and $150 million in direct management costs.  It will result in a good many change orders, too,
because one contractor will issue delay claims, due to the lack of progress
made by another contractor.  Delays of
this nature will surely get messy and expensive for Nalcor, and by default the
people of the province.  Then there are
the damages must pay Emera for their delay. 

it is time for Nalcor to acknowledge that the final cost of the project includes
the interest during construction of the equity borrowed by the provincial
government.  The province will be
injecting nearly $3 billion equity in this project, once the most recent
over-runs are considered.  The majority
of this money will be borrowed.  There is
a cost to borrowed equity.  It is
significant, too.  

Nalcor and the Provincial government want to acknowledge the fact or not,
Muskrat Falls is a $10 billion dollar project, possibly higher, when all the
costs are reflected in the estimate and the entire IDC is recognized.  

the failure of Nalcor to be forthright with the people of the province, with
respect to both the date for first power and anticipated project costs, is
eroding the professionalism to which the Crown Corporation lays claim. It is
obvious to anyone, in the business, that full power from Muskrat Falls will not
be available until 2019. Even to meet this completion date, strong execution will
be needed throughout the remainder of the project. 

refusal to be transparent is worrisome. Martin’s obfuscation gives rise to many
questions about the mandate this Crown Corporation, especially its ability

public may not be ready to digest the reality of even higher costs; but they
should get ready. $10 billion in 2020 may, yet, be a best case scenario.


Bill left public life shortly after the signing of the Atlantic Accord and became a member of the Court of Appeal until his retirement in 2003. During his time on the court he was involved in a number of successful appeals which overturned wrongful convictions, for which he was recognized by Innocence Canada. Bill had a special place in his heart for the underdog.

Churchill Falls Explainer (Coles Notes version)

If CFLCo is required to maximize its profit, then CFLCo should sell its electricity to the highest bidder(s) on the most advantageous terms available.


This is the most important set of negotiations we have engaged in since the Atlantic Accord and Hibernia. Despite being a small jurisdiction we proved to be smart and nimble enough to negotiate good deals on both. They have stood the test of time and have resulted in billions of dollars in royalties and created an industry which represents over a quarter of our economy. Will we prove to be smart and nimble enough to do the same with the Upper Churchill?


  1. When ever anyone spoke about the cost of Muskrat Falls hitting a double digit teen number they were jumped on, ridiculed and dragged through the mud. Just like alternative energy works everywhere in the world except for NL; the financial woes of all large hydro dam projects around the world can't happen in NL. The government and Nalcor claimed they had the best experts so we never had to fear. Well, thanks to all the people and all the believers we moved forward and now as the MF project moves along we are seeing what a load of monkey crap we were force fed. Thanks for shaggin' up our future.

  2. reels of wire from Bahrain , steel from India , all shipped past every Western Newfoundland Port, sent to three rivers Que , handled ,yarded , reloaded into containers , sent to Halifax , unloaded , put aboard trucks , trucked back to NL .

    What didnt go that way , got shipped past the west coast again to Argentia , yarded , handled , reloaded shipped back to west coast ???
    I guess the materials for this project were gaining travel points or something ? I can see nothing less than 20 Million in their mindless handling of just this portion of the project.
    I do not think it ever made sense for the marshalling yard and main offices to be on the East Coast for a Labrador, Northern Peninsula and Western project. GONG SHOW

  3. My biggest concern is that none of the provincial leaders seems to be ready and willing to hold Martin to account or make significant changes to the way the project is progressing. While other big resource based projects are slacking off because of commodity prices dropping, Muskrat Falls seems to be seeing contracted services costing more than expected. With a dearth of big projects to bid on, we should be seeing savings from contracted services, not an inflation on bids.

  4. The most important fact to consider here is that Nalcor & the Minister involved keep saying even with cost over-runs, Muskrat Falls was the cheapest option. How can any of these so called professionals get away with that statement. Muskrat falls was the most expensive option by leaps and bounds. There were 2 other options that would not have cost the taxpayers or the government, one cent. The best option would not have cost any money, risk or liability:
    1) The current Hydro system in NL. could have been modified by 100% according to Shawmont NL Ltd., when they completed most of the hydro installations and engineering, they said the installed capacity at these sites could be doubled at any time in the future without any major changes to the infrastructure. When the turbines are overhauled at scheduled maintenance periods, turbines with twice the capacity could be placed instead of the overhaul, costing less than the overhaul, hence no cost, risk or liability.
    2) Wind power, an option offered by Labrador Coastal Equipment Ltd, did not get an opportunity to make it's presentation, a presentation that would not cost anything. Nalcor chose to fabricate a phony cost related to a similar wind power option with the help of Manitoba Hydro, at an unknown cost. Bottom line for wind power, Nalcor says the wind power cost would exceeded 10 billion and was not reliable. In fact the Avalon Wind Power Project would have cost $3,000,000,000, 3 billion and the government of NL would not have to pay out one cent for that option, plus no risk or liability. A Power Purchase Agreement was in the works to sell the power to NLH only when needed (when Holyrood would have to be fired up) at a price of 4.5 cents per KWH, approx. 95% less than it was costing to produce each KWH at the Holyrood Diesel Plant.
    Q. (Why was the most expensive option chosen)
    A. (There is no other way to say it, it has to be complete incompetence,or corruption), neither one of these reasons is acceptable.

    • Gerry, your comments are very telling in regard to this fiasco of a project. One has to ask why Danny Williams just recently spoke out in support of the project and the management team. Where is Danny in all this and why is he still trying to influence the people of this province. When all is said and done, I hope the people of this province reflect back on how this all started and who shoved this down our throat. Wait until future government leaders have to deal with the elderly and low income families who will suffer great hardship when the heat bill doubles. Billions of dollars in revenue have been squandered and the provincial government pension plans are all but bankrupt all as a result of mismanagement.

      Where will Danny be once the proverbial hits the fan? One thing is certain, he'll crawl out from under the woodpile and find some obscure way of faulting future government and someone else. As for Ed Martin, he will be nowhere to be found.

      The conservative party in NL is doomed as they should be. And, for the those who have been loyal supporters, they should reflect back on how their demise was brought about. As for the liberal party, take heed and don't waste any time when you take over governing this province to deal with this issue. Even if t can't be stopped, make sure the people get a full account of what occurred with this project. Finally, deal with Ed Martin and his incompetence and unwillingness to provide forthright answers to the people of this province.