During my two years of review of Muskrat
Falls, I have often asked myself what future generations will think of the
project.  What will be public perception
of the engineering, the economics and most importantly the political debate
which surrounded it? 

In an era when blogs, newspaper
articles, and VOCM call-in programs are all recorded for posterity, how will future
generations of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians view the leaders of today?  In particular, what will they say about the
execution of their responsibility to safeguard the interests of the tax

Will the critics including Vardy,
Penney, Martin, Sullivan, and Hollett be viewed as fear mongers, visionaries or
simply as democrats?
  On what side of
history will they lie?
Despite all assurances from the experts,
time will produce a final arbiter of the economic merit of the project.
  The final construction costs, combined with the future
world price of energy, and the power demands of the Province will constitute
the most quantitative parts of that evaluation.

Even though future success will silence
the legacy of the present day critics, I am certain that future political
scientists will study how our democratic institutions were tempered, in order
for the project to proceed. 

In the 21st century, when other Western
democracies strived to increase transparency, public engagement and political accountability,
Newfoundland and Labrador went against the grain.  Under any unbiased examination, the
democratic legacy of Muskrat Falls will certainly fall upon the wrong side of

It would not be fair to place the blame
solely on the current Progressive Conservative government.  When the previous Liberal administration excluded the Lower Churchill Project from the purview of the Public Utilities Board, in
 a slippery slope began to take
shape.  It was the beginning of a process
of excluding the project from normal democratic controls.  That process was key to ensuring transparency
and accountability in the expenditure of public funds. 

Although the Liberal’s conceived the
project under a shroud of secrecy, it was a different project than the current
  The Liberals had a deal which
would see the larger Gull Island constructed first, with no immediate link to
the Island.
  Instead of being financed by
Newfoundland tax payers, it was financed through a power purchase agreement
with Hydro Quebec.
  The price was adjusted
for inflation and the deal included a basement price for Gull Island of
  There was a distribution of
risk between the partners Hydro Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador

By the time the Liberals were turfed
from power, in 2003, some $57 million of taxpayer’s money was already spent on
the project.   The newly elected
Progressive Conservative Government noted a lack of normal oversight on the
procurement of certain services with direct intervention from the Premier’s
Office: A Government Press Release stated:

However, Minister Byrne indicated that such a process
[Request for Proposals] was not followed for the selection and awarding of
contracts to several different law firms and to communications consultants. The
bulk of the legal services was contracted to Patterson Palmer Hunt and Murphy
at a cost of approximately $2.7 million, with a further $915,843 spent at
Chalker Green and Rowe/McInnis Cooper. The communications costs included
$461,000 to SNC-Lavelin and approximately $400,000 to Bristol Communications.

“The direction came directly from the premier’s
office as to which law firms and communications companies were to be hired to
carry out the required work,” said Minister Byrne
From very early on, the Lower Churchill
project lacked the proper governance expected of a Crown Corporation. 

In 2007, the William’s Government
launched the Energy Plan.  The initial legislative
vehicle was the 2007 Energy Corporation Act which “established an energy
corporation for the province”.  The
Corporation was later re-branded “Nalcor”.  

The legislation removed the obligation
of the Crown Corporation to adhere to the Public Tendering Act, protected vast
amounts of sensitive information from the Access to Information Laws, and
limited the powers of the Auditor General to review the activities of Nalcor.  The Act was revised in 2008 to even further protect
Nalcor from being forced to engage the normal processes of public
Nalcor has benefited immensely from the
largesse of the taxpayers of Newfoundland and Labrador.   

Between 2006 and 2013, $1.4 Billion was
directly invested in Nalcor in the form of deferred dividends and direct equity
contributions.  Those investments allowed
Nalcor to grow into a diversified energy company under the shield of secrecy
afforded by the Energy Corporation Act. 

The evolution of Nalcor bucked the trend
for crown corporations in strong western democracies.
  The Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is an international organization founded in 1961 to promote
trade, and economic progress.
  It is
committed to democracy, a market economy, and set best practices for economic
  Canada is a founding Member.  To understand how out of step Nalcor and the Province
are with modern democracies one would do well to read
 the OECD’s recommended practice for Crown Corporations. Nalcor is far from the “model” the OECD promotes.

As the world moves to higher
transparency, independence, and market competition, in Newfoundland and
Labrador our insular government has moved in a completely opposite direction.  It has used strong arm tactics to ensure that
both Government and Nalcor (both unwittingly joined at the hip) were positioned
to proceed with the Lower Churchill Project. 

Armed with the original exemption, the
Provincial Government intended that the Public Utilities Board was involved only in setting the power rates for the project.
contrary to the terms of the Electrical Power Control Act, the public would not
be permitted transparency on the question of whether Muskrat Falls is the
lowest cost alternative. 

Public opposition and a damning report
from the Canadian Environmental Agency forced the Government to refer the
project to the Public Utilities Board.  Still,
the Government still did not permit a full review.  The Maritime Link was removed from the terms
of reference and the reference question was limited to two options only.  They included the Interconnected Case (with
Muskrat Falls) and the Isolated Island. 

By omitting the Maritime Link component
of the project, the terms of reference severely impacted the effectiveness of
the review.  Simply put, the PUB was not
permitted the opportunity to review the deal as it was negotiated.  Using narrow terms-of -reference and a ring-fenced
reference question, the Government attempted to railroad the PUB’s approval of
the project.   

Instead of Government keeping Nalcor
accountable and protecting tax payers, it became the primary accomplice for
limiting public review of the project.     

As limited as it was, the PUB review was
very beneficial.  It identified several
major shortcomings in the project.  Most
startling, to the Author, was the manner in which Nalcor abandoned its own Gated
Management Process. 

Without proper public review, or
political challenge, due diligence is entirely reliant upon internal controls
within Nalcor. 

As with any company, there should be a
solid business case presented; one which identifies all the risks and benefits of the

Nalcor employs a Gated
Management Process, which is a recognized method of planning large
projects.  The project is divided into a
number of Phases divided by gates, or decision points.  At each gate the status of the project is
reviewed and the criteria for proceeding are re-affirmed.  The Process is usually facilitated by a
steering committee of senior management. The following Exhibit, from Nalcor’s
July 2011 Presentation to the PUB, is instructive:

The Gated Management Process initiated
by Nalcor in 2006 was used for the development of the Lower Churchill.
  Decision Gate 1, completed in February 2007,
was not used for the purpose of providing the lowest cost power to the Province.
  Rather, its purpose was to develop the Lower
Churchill primarily for export.
Decision Gate 2 report, presented to the PUB (Exhibit 22), offered limited
discussion of alternatives to the project.
It engaged in even less discussion about project economics.  It was purely a readiness review.

When the decision was made, in July 2010,
to abandon Gull Island (for export) and to proceed with Muskrat Falls,
ostensibly to meet the Island’s growing electrical requirement, the DG2 mandate
should have changed to examine all potential alternatives for meeting our
electrical needs.  The principal outcome ought
to have identified the lowest cost alternative to NL ratepayers.   Nalcor’s DG2 reports, submitted to the PUB,
showed little evidence of such analysis. 

In the opinion of the Author, this deficiency
constituted not just a failure in Nalcor’s management processes; it contravened
its legislated responsibility under the Electrical Power Control Act.  Nalcor failed to provide the least cost
option for NL ratepayers.  

If Muskrat Falls is not a success, historians
will view the DG2 endorsement as the critical failure point in Nalcor’s governance.

As the project proceeds, Nalcor continues
to withhold critical information.   No update has been forthcoming on the total cost
estimate of the project in over 15 months. 
The Crown Corporation has not yet responded to many critical questions such as those posed by Uncle Gnarley Blog.

This Blog questioned (i) the amount of
Capacity and Energy which will be available to the Island once Muskrat Falls
comes on-line in 2017, and (ii) details of Nalcor’s commitment to Emera.

The Maritime Link was excluded from PUB review of the project.  It is still not clear if the engineering
calculations, submitted by Nalcor, properly reflected the delivery of 167 MWs
to Emera during peak winter months.  Was the
lowest cost conclusion based on getting access to the entire output of Muskrat
Falls during the winter?  Is there sufficient
Capacity remaining for our own requirements once the 167 MW peak-period
delivery is made? 

If the Strategist (a forecasting tool) runs,
submitted to the PUB, did not include the 167 MWs, how will the Island’s peak
requirements be met in winter?  What is
the potential impact on the rates? 

These are critical questions which must
be answered by Nalcor.  If the 167 MWs
was excluded from the lowest cost analysis submitted to the PUB and endorsed by
Manitoba Hydro, it would undermine the entire process. 

These questions can be easily answered
by Nalcor. They can be validated by the
public release of the Power Purchase Agreement signed between Nalcor and
Newfoundland Hydro to fulfil the requirements of the Federal Loan Guarantee.   The
fact that such an important agreement has not been released is

Many of the public comments submitted as
part of the ongoing PUB review reflect these same questions.  Other are outstanding regarding the
reliability of the island system once Muskrat Falls comes on-line and Holyrood
is decommissioned. 

Nalcor has done itself no favor by, yet
again, limiting the release of this information. 

The following is a direct quote from the
PUB’s Pre-hearing Conference: 

With respect to
the fifth item proposed by Newfoundland Power regarding the potential review of
measures to ensure reliability after commissioning of Muskrat Falls and the
Labrador Island Link, we believe that that matter is beyond the appropriate
scope for this review” 

              Mr. MacDougal – Legal Counsel for Newfoundland Hydro

it in the best interests of tax payers that Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro petition
the PUB to exclude Muskrat Falls from ongoing review by that Agency?  Hardly.  NLH is essentially prolonging both the Government’s
and Nalcor attempt’s to limit public scrutiny of critical decisions they have
taken.  These questions are inextricably linked to
huge financial obligations to which the public is now committed. 

Power demands a more detailed assessment. 
The Company evidently recognizes that its corporate image is at risk five
years from now when domestic rates must bear the Muskrat Falls project, the
third line to the Avalon, and the third line to Labrador West.   Rates will increase considerably.  If Holyrood must stay open beyond 2021, and
undergo further upgrades, our power rates will be even higher. 

we await the decision of the PUB we must wonder what Chairman Andy Wells is
thinking?  Will he limit the scope of the
review as requested by Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro?  Will the PUB make the right decision and
review the reliability of the system post-Muskrat Falls?  Will the PUB permit the public their first
opportunity to truly understand the impacts of the Maritime Link? 

Provincial Government, Nalcor and the critics, including this Author, will
eventually be judged by history.  

as it conducts an investigation into matters relating to the security of the
Island’s power supply, including the events that caused the ‘black-outs’ of
early January, the PUB is challenged to be on the right side of history once again. 

one has ever questioned that Agency’s independence.  The issue outstanding is whether we will be
left to question its courage. 
judgement of history awaits us all. 


Editor’s Note: This Post was written by “JM”, the anonymous researcher, writer and 
presenter, to the PUB and in local Blogs, on the Muskrat Falls Project. JM has written a 
number of Uncle Gnarley pieces, including, most recently, Gnarley’s Theory of Political Devolution, Parts I and II and The Great Revolutionaru From the Shore
.  One of his latest Papers is entitled: Muskrat Falls Revenue Stream: Fact or Fiction.  JM has also submitted most recently to the PUB a Paper entitled:  Underestimating Peak Load and the Potential Impact on the Muskrat Falls Solution.  To recent readers to Uncle Gnarley Blog, who may be unfamiliar with “JM”, I would say that, while circumstances require his anonymity, you will be impressed with the depth of his analysis on many aspects of the Muskrat Falls Project.  Also, look for his Presentation to the PUB which formed part of that Agency’s analysis of the Muskrat Falls Project – Des Sullivan


If a Big Mac costs McDonalds $10 to produce and it is sold for $1.50, McDonalds will go out of business. They would not declare a profit!


Bill left public life shortly after the signing of the Atlantic Accord and became a member of the Court of Appeal until his retirement in 2003. During his time on the court he was involved in a number of successful appeals which overturned wrongful convictions, for which he was recognized by Innocence Canada. Bill had a special place in his heart for the underdog.

Churchill Falls Explainer (Coles Notes version)

If CFLCo is required to maximize its profit, then CFLCo should sell its electricity to the highest bidder(s) on the most advantageous terms available.


  1. I respect JM's contributions to this whole debate, especially his exhaustive and well-written articles on the more technical aspects of this project. His anonymity, however, is problematic from my perspective, as it suggests that sinister forces are in play in this province. No person, whatever their position, should be subjected to any form of sanction or repercussion for speaking the truth, especially when backed up by irrefutable facts and intelligent probing. His contributions to the discussion and his fact-based approach has been invaluable to non-technical people like me, and for that I thank him from the bottom of my heart.

    I have no doubt that the critics he takes note of were, and are, very sincere in their objection to this project. They have no axe to grind and nothing to gain or lose, from my perspective, so why would they simply criticize for the sake of criticizing. Like me, they are concerned about the future of this province and firmly believe that the Muskrat Falls project will do grave harm to our economy, in the form of a huge burden of debt that will hamper the financial well being of the people of the province. Some of them were associated with former PC or Liberal administrations but it is obvious, to any unbiased observer, that all are united in their concern for the well being of the province.

    The fact that the current PC administration has usurped democracy and engaged in obfuscation to hide the essential facts of this project should be an affront to all Newfoundlanders and Labradorians. Only people with a vested interest in this project seem to be avid supporters of this project although I have to confess to not understanding why so many others seem to be apathetic and indifferent.

    From my perspective, Danny Williams and his style of governance led to the dearth of leadership we see in most of our politicians and I call upon both present and former members of government to stand up and show some fortitude. Break ranks with the government if you have any real interest in the future of the province and rise up to challenge a nefarious scheme that will only benefit the select few. Unlike JM, I have absolutely no doubt that you would be on the "right" side of history.

  2. *JM and Des are doing the job that The Telegram demands your spare change to do
    Wangersky "Spare some change, spare some change, I'll tell you about dandylions and daffodils blowing in the spring breeze…"
    We would be better served by a CROWN NEWSPAPER, and QUEBEC-BASED ENERGY COMPANY!
    Someone will get "Ed Byrned" over this mashup project soon as a means of resetting the scandal odometer. "I didn't take the goddamn pens and keychains!" Hahaha, Like Crosbie and his Sacred Cod, ritual sacrifice of scapegoats makes the public feel vindicated by having someone to spit on. The environmental milestones were passed like Targa checkpoints by the Feds with outstanding hints of corruption still to be cleared up. NO LEVEL of projected methyl-mercury in Lake Melville would stop the Feds from attempting to offset the bitumen sands with carbon offset credits "manufactured" by inflating the cost, and the projected energy output, from MUSKRAT. This is the logic that makes an illogical, money sucker into an overall gem for the Feds. To be against river pollution and afraid of bankruptcy makes you an anti-capitalist climate denier (the worst kind of climate change denier) in the Aristotelian either/or double-blind frame of the project promoters. The Telegram does not have the mandate to use “The People’s Paper” in its masthead any longer in my opinion. It should be stripped, only to be reaffirmed with some decent journalism. If Wangersky, our self-appointed protector of the commons against crisp bags and pop cans, defender of the weal battling old pedal-bike rims, doesn’t feel the need to waltz outside the government’s well-constructed gilded frame to address our environmental concerns, then we will have to do it for him here. He may even get sent on an “Idiot Abroad” holiday like Michael Johansen if he writes the piece I want written. I don’t want to shame, and blame etc. Just explain, explain and explain. It is harder than shame/blaming, I know, I'm sorry for being so demanding on The Telegram and holding them to the professional standards of private bloggers!

  3. Thank you for your effort JM. I wonder what happens to our winter power supply and will we have to dump power in summer if NL loses the court case over water rights.
    Based on business logic I believe whoever owns the rights to the Upper Churchill power should also control water flow because due to head pressure the Upper Churchill extracts 7 times more energy from the same water. Consider that Hydro Quebec's major market is the air conditioning market and on average full load flow is only about two thirds the time so I expect they prefer to store the energy in the Smallwood Reservoir in winter. Without the Upper Churchill flow, MF is reduced to 170 MW and if there is a winter commitment to NS of 167 MW then there is nothing left for the island or even Labrador mines.
    Ed Martin indicated in an interview that Emera could supply in winter in case of the link going down to Labrador however they also use electric heat in NS and have a high winter load with expectations of getting at least 167 MW from Nalcor so either Emera builds back-up natural gas or we do here in NL (which should have been done in the first place). Also there are penalties in place for non delivery to NS and if Hydro Quebec decides it is in their best interest to store the energy in winter we are going to be in a hard situation.
    Ed Martin also indicated that a large part of 1.2 Twh committed to NS would come from island spillage in years with lots of rainfall. Now consider a heavy rainfall in spring, summer, or fall followed by warm weather. No heat load in either NL or NS and full bore output of 824 MW from MF (air conditioners going in the US) plus 1250 MW from the island hydro. A maximum of 500 MW can be exported. The remainder of power would be 1574 MW which is far more than NL can use. Therefore large spillage of water and further behind in meeting the 1.2 TWH.
    Given that it appears MF is forging ahead regardless of logic, we need to have a plan in case of losing that court case.